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Introduction
Human capital accumulation and Research and Development (R&D) activity are two primary determinants of economic growth. However, despite the fact that in the R&D-based growth literature an important research line has already investigated whether the presence of imperfect competition in the product market may be growth-enhancing or not, 1 this has not yet been done within an integrated economic growth model where agents (firms and individuals) may invest respectively in innovation and education activities and the growth engine is represented by the investment in human capital.
The aim of this paper is to combine in the simplest possible way the basic Lucas (1988) model of human capital accumulation with (a generalization of) the Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch. 3, pp. 43/57) model of endogenous technical change without knowledge spillovers in order to fill this gap in the literature. The reason why we focus on the Grossman and Helpman model without knowledge spillovers is as follows. We are interested in studying the nexus between imperfect product market competition (measured by the elasticity of substitution among different varieties of capital goods) and economic growth within an economy where the lever to economic development is schooling investment and not the R&D externality.
Apart from introducing human capital accumulation à la Lucas, the structure of our model economy remains very similar to the basic Grossman and Helpman's approach (1991, Ch. 3) mentioned above. In more detail, we postulate the existence of three vertically integrated sectors. A competitive final output sector produces a homogeneous consumers good. Depending on the value of a crucial parameter (that we interpret as the share of total income being devoted to the purchase of the available capital goods varieties) the final output sector technology may employ (with constant returns to scale) only human capital, only the existing varieties of intermediate goods or both (human capital and intermediates) as inputs. 2 The intermediate goods sector consists of monopolistically competitive firms, each producing a differentiated variety. We assume that the production of (whatever variety of) intermediate goods requires only human capital. Finally, the research activity produces designs (or blueprints) for new intermediate input varieties by employing only human capital, as well. When a new blueprint is discovered in the competitive R&D sector, an intermediate-goods producer acquires the perpetual patent over it. This allows the intermediate firm to manufacture the new variety and practice monopoly pricing forever. Population is stationary and a representative household invests portions of its fixed-time endowment to acquire formal education. Hence, in our model human capital can be used in each sector to produce a homogeneous final output, capital goods, infinitely-lived patents and new human capital, respectively.
Our main conclusions are threefold. First of all, we find that there always exist (except when the technology for the production of the homogeneous consumers good is linear in human capital) a positive relationship between product market power and aggregate productivity growth. Secondly, we get that both the type of technology being used in the final output sector (Cobb Douglas versus CES) and the way the (growing) human capital is allocated to the different activities (what we term by inter-sectoral competition for skills) do affect the relationship between aggregate productivity growth and monopoly power. Lastly, we also show that the type of technology being used in the final output sector and the inter-sectoral competition for the (growing) human capital also influence the level of the equilibrium (long-run) growth rate. This paper is especially related to two existing works. Bucci (2003b) also develops an endogenous growth model that integrates purposive R&D activity with human capital accumulation and where the engine of growth is represented by the investment in education activity. The present paper represents a generalisation of Bucci (2003b) .
The generalisation we propose here consists in writing the production technology in use in the downstream sector in such a way to disentangle the (equilibrium) monopolistic mark-up set in the intermediate sector and the degree of returns to specialization. 3 Due to this generalization, in the present paper we have the possibility of studying in detail, and within the same framework, the relationship between imperfect competition and economic growth as emerging from two different classes of endogenous growth models: a) the Rebelo's model (1991) with human (instead of physical) capital accumulation (or "AH model"), and b) the Grossman and Helpman's model (1991) of endogenous technological change without knowledge spillovers and human capital investment (or " Lucas -Grossman and Helpman's model") . In other words, the model we present in this paper enables us to analyse the potential implications (as for the monopoly powergrowth relationship) of the seminal Rebelo's (1991) and Grossman and Helpman's (1991) models when a positive skills supply à la Lucas (1988) is explicitly introduced within them and to compare such implications with those stemming from Bucci (2003b) .
The other paper which comes closer to ours is Bucci (2003a) . This paper examines what happens to the market power-growth nexus within a model where there is no human capital accumulation (skills are in fixed supply) and the engine of growth is represented by the externality in the R&D activity. Unlike Bucci (2003a) , in the present article we take an importantly different view, by considering an economy where the lever to economic growth is represented by a deliberate choice of investing in formal education by utility-maximizing agents.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 introduces the basic model. In Section 2 we study the general equilibrium of it and examine its steady-state properties.
In Section 3 we compute the equilibrium output growth rate of the economy and solve for the inter-sectoral distribution of human capital. Section 4 presents the results concerning the steady-state predictions of the model concerning the relationship between the type of production function employed in the downstream sector, the sectoral distribution of human capital, product market power and economic growth in some special cases. Section 5 concludes.
The Basic Model.
In this economy three vertically integrated sectors produce respectively a homogeneous consumers good, intermediate inputs and ideas. In order to produce the undifferentiated consumers good, an aggregate production function combines, with constant returns to scale, human capital and intermediate inputs. In this sector atomistic producers engage in perfect competition. The technology to produce final goods (Y) is given by:
As in Bucci (2003a) , we have written the production technology in use in the downstream sector in such a way to disentangle the (equilibrium) monopolistic mark-up set in the intermediate sector and the degree of returns from specialization. 4 Another reason why we employ the production function of equation (1) is that this technology allows to encompass as particular cases (and depending on the value of λ ) two recent models of endogenous growth 5 (one of which is not R&D-based) that in their original version do not include human capital accumulation. Even with respect to these models we are interested to study in this paper their potential implications (as for the monopoly power-growth relationship) when a positive supply of skills is explicitly introduced in them. As already mentioned, unlike Bucci (2003a) , we take here a different view by considering an economy where the lever to economic growth is human capital accumulation (and not the R&D externality).
According to equation (1) α , λ and A are technological parameters. The latter (total factor productivity) is strictly positive, whereas λ is (not strictly) between zero and one. In a momenti we will 4 Indeed, in a moment we will show that (under additional assumptions) the mark-up charged over the marginal cost by the monopolistic producers of intermediate inputs is 1/α . At the same time, from equation (1), it is possible to see that in a symmetric equilibrium (in which the total production of intermediates, X, is spread evenly between the n brands) the degree of returns to specialization (the exponent of n) is equal to ) 1 / 1 ( − α λ . This one is clearly different from the monopoly power measure ) / 1 ( α and, more importantly, depends not only on α but also on λ . In this sense, the model we present here represents an extension of Bucci (2003b) . 5 Namely the Rebelo (1991) and Grossman and Helpman's (1991, Ch. 3, pp. 43/57) models. see that the restriction on α ensures that in a symmetric equilibrium the istantaneous profit accruing to a generic intermediate producer at a given point in time is inversely related to the number of varieties existing at that date.
Since the industry is competitive, in equilibrium each variety of intermediates receives its own marginal product (in terms of the numeraire good, the final output):
In equation (2) 
represents the inverse demand function faced, at time t, by the generic j-th intermediate producer.
As it is common in the first generation innovationbased growth literature, the elasticity of substitution between two generic intermediates coincides with the price-demand elasticity faced by each capital goods producer and is equal to 1 1
The Intermediate Goods Sector.
In the intermediate sector, capital good producers engage in monopolistic competition. Each firm produces one (and only one) horizontally differentiated intermediate good and must purchase a patented design before producing its own specialised durable. Following Bucci (2003b) , we continue to assume that each local intermediate monopolist has access to the same technology, employing only human capital ( ):
,
This production function is characterised by constant returns to scale in the only input employed (human capital) and, according to it, one unit of skills is able to produce (at each time) the same constant quantity of whatever variety. B measures the productivity of human capital employed in this sector. The generic j-th firm maximises (with respect to ) its own instantaneous profit function under the (inverse) demand jt x constraint (equation (2)). Under the assumption that in the intermediate sector there exists no strategic interaction among firms, the resolution of this maximisation program gives the optimal price set by the generic j-th intermediate producer for one unit of its own output:
From equations (4) and (2), the wage rate accruing at time t to one unit of human capital employed in the capital goods sector ( ) is equal to:
In a symmetric equilibrium (where
), each local monopolist faces the same wage rate ( ,
) and equation (4) can be recast as:
The hypothesis of symmetry is dictated by the way through which each variety of intermediates enters the final output technology and by the fact that all the capital goods producers use the same production function (equation (3)).
Hence, when all the capital goods firms are identical, they produce the same quantity ( ), face the same wage rate accruing to intermediate human capital ( ) 
Finally, the instantaneous profit function of a generic j-th intermediate firm will be:
Since we are dealing with a monopolistic competition market, π will be decreasing in n Equation (6) says that, just as x and p, so too the instantaneous profit is equal for each variety of intermediates in a symmetric equilibrium.
The Research Sector.
There are many competitive research firms undertaking R&D. These firms produce designs indexed by 0 through an upper bound (thus, measures the total stock of society's knowledge). Designs are patented and partially excludable, but non-rival and indispensable for capital goods production. With access to the available stock of knowledge , research firms use human capital to develop new blueprints. The production of new designs is governed by:
where denotes the number of capital goods varieties existing at time t, is the total amount of human capital employed in the sector and C is the productivity of the research human capital input.
The production function of new ideas coincides with the one employed by Grossman and Helpman (1991) in their Chapter 3 model without knowledge spillovers (pp.43-57).
In that model such a specification of the R&D process implies the cessation of growth in the log run. In our model, instead, this does not happen since in our economy the engine of growth is represented by human capital accumulation. In this last sense the model we present here shares the same conclusions of many others with purposive R&D activity and skill accumulation. 7
As the research sector is competitive, imposing the zero profit condition amounts to setting:
In equations (8) and (9), represents the wage rate accruing to one unit of human capital devoted to research; the term exp is a present value factor which converts a unit of profit at time 
Households
Total output produced in this economy (Y) can be only consumed. Population is stationary and the available human capital is fully employed. For the sake of simplicity, we normalize population to one and postulate the existence of an infinitely-lived representative consumer with perfect foresight. This consumer owns, in the form of assets (a), all the firms operating in the economy and is endowed with one unit of time that he/she allocates (in the fraction u) to productive activities (research, capital goods and consumer goods manufacture), and (in the fraction 1-u) to non-productive activities (education). The representative consumer maximises, under constraints, the discounted value of his/her lifetime utility: 8 (10) , ,
The control variables of this problem are c and u , and and are the two state variables. Equation (10) is the intertemporal utility function; equation (11) is the budget constraint and equation (12) 
Equation (13) gives the discounted marginal utility of consumption, which satisfies the dynamic optimality condition in equation (15). Equation (14) is the static optimality condition for the allocation of time, equating the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of an additional unit of skills devoted to working. The marginal cost involves the cost associated with future reductions in human capital, as expressed by the other dynamic optimality condition in equation (16). Conditions (13) through (16) must satisfy the constraints (11) and (12), together with the transversality conditions:
9 Notice that we assume no depreciation for human capital. This hypothesis is completely harmless in the present context and serves the scope of simplifying the analysis. Also notice that we consider the variant of the basic Lucas model (1988) in which spillovers from education are internalised. This is done because we are explicitly assuming that there exists only one agent and population is stationary. 10 The equilibrium wage rate accruing to human capital is unique since this factor input is perfectly mobile across sectors.
General Equilibrium Analysis and the Steady State of the Model.
In this section we solve for the general equilibrium of the model and characterise its steady state under the symmetry hypothesis
. At this aim, after defining by u* the optimal fraction of skills devoted by the representative consumer to production activities, 11 the general equilibrium distribution of human capital between research, capital and consumer goods production can be obtained through solving simultaneously the following equations: (17) is a resource constraint, saying that at any time t the sum of the human capital demands coming from each productive activity must be equal to the total stock of productive human capital available at the same time. Equations (18a) and (18b) together state that, due to human capital mobility across sectors, in equilibrium the wage earned by one unit of human capital is to be the same irrespective of the productive sector where that unit of skill is actually employed.
Moreover, since the total value of the representative agent's assets (a) must equal the total value of firms, the next equation has also to be checked in a symmetric equilibrium:
where V is given by equation (9) 
Definition: Steady State (or Balanced Growth Path) Equilibrium
A steady state (or balanced growth path) equilibrium is an equilibrium where the growth rate of all variables depending on time is constant, human (H) and knowledge (n) capital grow at the same rate and , , all grow at the same constant rate as
With this definition in mind we notice that, when (the growth rate of H) is constant, then u is constant as well (see equation (12)). 12 This means that, along the balanced growth path, the household will optimally decide to devote a constant fraction of its fixed time endowment to working (u*) and education (1-u*) activities. Solving explicitly the representative consumer's problem, it is possible to show that the following results do hold in the steady state (mathematical derivation of such results can be obtained from the author upon request):
; 12 Given our assumptions on the size of the representative household and the population growth rate, h ≡ H (which implies that we can use instead of ).
According to result (20), the real interest rate (r) is constant. Equation (21) states that along the balanced growth path, the number of new ideas (n), the consumer's total human capital stock (H) and the human capital stocks devoted respectively to the final output production ( ), to the intermediate sector ( ) and to research ( ) all grow at the same constant rate, given by the difference between the schooling technology productivity parameter (
δ ) and the subjective discount rate ( ρ ). Equation (22) gives the equilibrium growth rate of consumption and the consumer's asset holdings.
Equations (23) and (24), instead, give respectively the equilibrium values of the constant and ratios, whereas equation (25) represents the optimal and constant fraction of the representative agent's time endowment that he/she will decide to allocate to working activities (u*). For the growth rate of the variables in equations (21) and (22) 
Endogenous Growth and the Shares of Human Capital devoted to the different activities.
To compute the output growth rate of this economy in a symmetric, steady state equilibrium, first rewrite equation (1) as follows:
Then, taking logs of both sides of this expression, totally differentiating with respect to time and recalling that in the steady-state equilibrium (21) above), we obtain:
Hence, economic growth depends only on α (the inverse of which can be easily interpreted as a measure of the monopoly power enjoyed by each intermediate local monopolist 13 ), λ (which represents the share of total income being devoted in a symmetric equilibrium to the purchase of all the available capital goods varieties 14 ) and the accumulation rate of human capital ( ). In this last respect the model supports the main conclusion of that branch of the endogenous growth literature pioneered by Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988) . 15 As a consequence, and in line with this literature, our analysis does not display any scale effect, since depends neither on the absolute dimension of the economy (its total human capital stock), nor on the population growth rate (that, indeed, is equal to zero in our model). 16
In equation (1a) the equilibrium growth rate of output depends on ) 1 ( − β λ that measures the returns to specialization. Such returns depend (positively) not only on β (the monopoly power), but also on λ . The intuition behind this result is as follows: the higher the mark-up rate that can be charged over the marginal cost in the monopolistic sector and the share of national income spent on the intermediate inputs, the higher the return an intermediate producer may obtain from specialising in the production of the marginal variety of capital goods. Moreover, it is also worth pointing out that β enters the equilibrium growth rate when (and only when) λ is not equal to zero (i.e. when capital goods are an input in the production of the final good). This is clear when one considers that the only product market where imperfect competition prevails in the model is the intermediate one. 13 The higher α , the higher the elasticity of substitution between two generic intermediate inputs. This means that they become more and more alike when α grows and, as a consequence, the price elasticity of the derived demand curve faced by a local monopolist tends to be infinitely large when α tends to one. Thus, the inverse of α ( α / 1 ) may be considered as a measure of how uncompetitive the capital goods sector is. Before being able to compute the shares of human capital devoted to the different economic activities, we first need to determine an expression for the equilibrium human to technological capital ratio ( n H R / ≡ ). At this aim, we use equation (17), with
, and obtain:
Equating the last expression above to equation (21) yields: (27) [ ]
Given R, the shares of human capital devoted to each sector employing this factor input in the decentralised, symmetric balanced growth path equilibrium can be easily determined as follows: (28) ) 1
Technology, Sectoral Distribution of Human Capital and the
Interplay between Product Market Power and Economic Growth.
All the results stated up to now have been obtained under the assumptions that δ is strictly greater than ρ . 18 In the present section, while keeping this assumption, we study how the sectoral shares of human capital and the relationship between product market power and economic growth may change when λ is assumed to be respectively equal to zero, one and α (i.e., when we allow the production function in the downstream sector to vary).
Case (a):
In this case the technologies adopted in each economic sector (in the symmetric, steady state equilibrium) are the following:
(for the final goods production); 
As is well known, both in Rebelo (1991) and Lucas (1988) , technical progress happens through devoting resources to physical (human) capital accumulation rather than a deliberate R&D activity aimed at expanding the set of available (horizontally differentiated) capital goods. In case (a) Lucas (1988) , this last coincides with the growth rate of human capital and is equal to the difference between the productivity of the schooling technology (
) and the subjective discount rate ( ρ ). 19 Finally, it is worth noticing that, in a long run equilibrium where each sector gets a constant fraction of the available stock of human capital, affects only the level of output (Y ), whereas its growth rate is solely driven by (
Case (b): 1 = λ .
In this case the technologies employed in each economic sector (in the symmetric steady state equilibrium) are the following: Case (c):
The last special case we wish to deal with in this section is the case where In the present case human capital is employed in each economic sector. Thus, we can identify this case (unlike the two previous ones) as that in which the inter-sectoral competition for the same input (human capital) is tougher ( , , and are all positive). As before, the accumulation rate of human capital is equal in equilibrium to The main results of the model concerning the relationship between the type of production technology in use in the downstream sector, the inter-sectoral distribution of human capital, the degree of product market power and the aggregate growth rate can be summarised through the following propositions:
Result 1
In a generalised, integrated growth model of deterministic R&D activity and human capital accumulation where economic growth is sustained by a supply of skills à la Lucas (1988) , as the one described by the equilibrium equations (20) 
Proof: See equations (1a), (32), (33) and (34).
The reason why there exists no relationship between market power and growth when 0 = λ is that in this case there is neither an intermediate sector, nor a research one (accordingly, the output growth rate is completely independent of the mark-up that in the model arises from the capital goods sector). What Result 1 seems to suggest is the following: as far as the steady state relationship between the degree of product market power and economic growth is concerned, we can replicate one of the most important results obtained in the basic Schumpeterian model of growth 23 by using a horizontal product differentiation approach where: 1) the engine of growth is human capital accumulation; 2) there exists no pecuniary externality from purposive R&D activity,
